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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a modification of a standard four input production
process where energy is used  in an inefficient way due to partly unnecessary waste of energy.
In this production process, R&D investment is an additional input in order to improve energy
efficiency. It closes the gap between energy purchased and energy used effectively. The more
is invested, the less is the waste of energy. With the cost and benefit of R&D investment
incorporated in our model of the firm, we analyze the impact of an energy tax on R&D effort,
on output and on the waste of energy. The model is implemented empirically by choosing a
translog cost function and a set of first-order conditions, using data for the German chemical
industry, 1970-1995. In a simulation study based on higher energy prices we found
outsourcing as the consequent reaction of the firm - more material is used and less of energy,
labor, and capital, given the unchanged output level. There is no indication of a double
dividend in terms of environmental improvement as well as higher demand for labor on the
industry level calling for a computable general equilibrium approach in order to answer this
open question.
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1. Introduction
It is wellknown that results from an environmental policy in response to global climate change
are quite sensitive to the assumption on the rate of energy efficiency improvements. However,
technical progress is traditionally considered as a non-economic variable in economic policy
models. It is exogenous in most policy evaluations as well as in the theory of environmental
economics. Everybody agrees that the neglect of induced technological progress may lead to
overestimation of the costs of greenhouse gas reduction, but no one knows how technological
progress responses to economic incentives. This obviously hampers thinking about schedules of
emission mitigation targets and policies of sustainable development in the presence of
uncertainty. The omission of induced technological change might lead to underestimation of the
net benefits of tighter environmental policies because such a policy can induce major technical
advances in abatement technologies.
Most models either neglect the role of technological change, or exogenous Hicks-neutral
technical change is introduced (The increased output of other goods and services per unit of
input and the increase in emissions reduction per unit of input are the same). One of the few
attempts to (partly) endogenize technical change is the approach followed by the Jorgenson and
Wilcoxen (1990) model for the US and later by the G-Cubed model of McKibbin and Wilcoxen
(1992). Technological development is partly endogenized by the specification of productivity
growth as a function of the prices of all inputs of an industry. In this approach substitution away
from polluting inputs can affect the rate of productivity growth. A decrease in an industry’s
productivity level will raise the price of its output relative to its input prices, i.e. the industry will
become less competitive. If the bias of technical change is input of type i using and the price of
such a pollution intensive input increases (e.g. by a tax), then cost reduction due to productivity
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4growth will be reduced. Technological development is treated only partially in these models
because an autonomous trend is included which interacts with the prices of intermediate inputs.
The translog unit cost functions are functions of the prices of all inputs and of time t as an index
of technology. There is price induced productivity growth in the model which affects input
shares. But technological change is not endogenized in terms of leading to new vintages of
durable goods, to new products or to different qualities or major breakthroughs. The models by
Glomsrod et.al. or by Hazilla and Kopp endogenize fuel specific technical change in a similar
way, i.e. as an incentive for substitution only.
Autonomous energy efficiency improvements (AEEI) are more difficult to estimate than
those that are induced by price increases. AEEI decouples resource demand and economic
output, and so yields resource-saving technical change. Econometric investigations by Jorgenson
and Wilcoxen (1990) of the US post-1947 historical record show no evidence for autonomous
time trends of this type. Technologically oriented end-use analysts, however, have suggested that
non-price efficiency improvements may be induced by changes in public policy like a mandatory
doubling of average fuel efficiency of automobiles during the course of ten years. Manne and
Richels (1991) introduce those exogenous efficiency improvements, for example. Their
production function also allows for the possibility of costless AEEI which reduce the share of
energy in GNP over time. A factor for autonomous energy efficiency improvement integrates all
non-price induced changes in energy intensity and therefore represents the efficiency effect of
technological, structural and political objectives (e.g. voluntary agreements). This approach
emphasizes to show the effect of technical change but can not model aspects like innovation,
adaptation or diffusion.
An alternative approach to endogenize technical change is the use of capital vintages
involving different technologies. The differentiation of technologies can have effects on the form
of the production function, on the input structure, or on flexibility (different elasticities of
substitution for the vintages). With new vintages substitution possibilities among production
factors are higher than with old vintages. In Bergman (1990) the "old" production units in steel
or pulp and paper industries are assumed to have zero elasticities of substitution, whereas the
elasticity of substitution of "new" production units in these industries is positive. In GREEN's1
dynamic structure, two kinds of capital goods coexit in each period, "old" capital installed in
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5previous periods, and "new" capital resulting from current-period investment. This putty/semi-
putty technology also implies different substitution possibilities by age of capital.2
A further methodological approach to take into account the vintage concept is to replace
capital K in a variable cost function by Solow's (1959) expression for an effective capital stock.
In his 1959 article, Solow criticized the disembodied nature of technical change in aggregate
production functions. He emphasized the fact that most improvements in technology need to be
embodied in net capital formation, or in the replacement of old-fashioned equipment, before they
can be made effective. Solow proposed to distinguish capital equipment of different vintages and
formulated a Cobb-Douglas function for output produced with capital of a given vintage.
Technical change is represented by a rate of embodied technical change as well as of
disembodied technical change. His measure of effective capital incorporates the assumption that
all technical progress is embodied in the improving quality of successive vintages of capital
investment.3
If technical progress is unembodied in capital plant and equipment, then its effects do not
depend in any way on the rate of investment in capital plant and equipment. An alternative
notion is that technical progress is entirely embodied in the design and operating characteristics
of new capital plant and equipment. According to this view, the energy saving effects of
embodied technical progress depend critically on the rate at which new investment goods diffuse
into the economy, i.e. on the vintage composition of the capital stock. For policy measures the
nature of technical progress matters. If technical progress is embodied, tax credits for
investments in new energy-efficient equipment provide an incentive to realize its effects more
quickly than if technical change were unembodied. However, under embodied technical change
energy savings can be realized only by changing the energy using characteristics of the long-
lived capital stock, whereas under unembodied technical change the effectiveness of the entire
capital stock is augmented regardless of its vintage composition. One example of unembodied
technical change is learning by doing in which workers learn how to produce more efficiently.
                                                          
2 A more formal presentation of the aspect that the latest vintage, added to the aggregate capital stock, embodies
innovation and technical improvement can be found in Conrad and Henseler-Unger (1986). The methodological
approach is an integration of price-dependent input coefficients with input coefficients of the latest vintage, both
derived from cost functions. The elasticity of substitution is the same for old and new vintages but the
distribution parameters in the CES functions differ.
3 For a CGE application see Conrad and Ehrlich (1993).
6However, if technical progress were embodied, it augments only the most recent vintage of
investment, and not any of the earlier vintages of surviving capital.
Energy oriented CGE models introduce exogenously provided new technologies which
are known but not yet implemented. These backstop technologies are already known today, but
are options commercially of interest in the future. The introduction of these technologies
depends on maturation (exogenous penetration time) as well as on the cost of production relative
to competitive technologies. Backstop inputs are modeled to be available at an unlimited
quantity for an exogenously given price. A precise knowledge of the technology in question is
not necessary.
More recent approaches to endogenize technological change are based on expanding
product variety, or improving the quality of (intermediate) products, or models based on
human capital accumulation.4 The first group of these models treat R&D activity like other
production activities which convert primary inputs into knowledge (Romer (1990), Grossman
and Helpman (1991)). The total amount of knowledge or, equivalently, the level of technology
enforces growth, increases the number of new intermediate products or the variety of
technologies. In the second group of models (e.g. Aghion and Howitt (1992)), technological
progress increases the productivity of the intermediate good in the production of the final
good. Here, innovation produced by the research sector improves the quality of the
intermediate good which replaces the older one. In these models the outcome of an innovation
is uncertain and the number of researchers is endogenous. The third group focuses on
endogenous growth by pointing out that capital accumulation and growth will be more rapid
in countries that are better endowed of physical and human capital (Lucas (1988)). In the
literature on environmental policy and economic growth Bovenberg and Smulders (1996)
have build an endogenous growth model in this spirit which describes endogenous technical
advances in environmentally friendly technologies. In their model there is an environmental
R&D sector which produces environmental technology capital in order to raise total factor
productivity.
The model we present in this paper belongs in its spirit to the second group because it
focuses on the improvement of the use of energy as an intermediate good in the production
process. Depending on the price of energy, part of energy is wasted in the production process. If
a tax on energy or on carbon dioxide increases the price of energy, firms invest in energy saving
process R&D in order to improve the efficiency of the energy input. Since we want to estimate
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7our model econometrically because we are interested in the impact of higher energy taxation on
energy efficiency, we propose a less sophisticated model than some of those found in the
theoretical literature. After presenting our approach of an endogenous energy efficiency index in
section 2, we determine in section 3 the response of the firm to higher energy prices using a
comparative statics analysis. In section 4 we implement this model empirically by using time
series data of the German chemicals industry. In section 5 we discuss the results and carry out a
simulation study in order to quantify the impact of a energy tax on energy efficiency. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2. A model with inefficient use of energy
We consider a production technology which produces a good of quantity x with the KLEM
inputs, capital (K), labor (L), gross energy (GE) and material (M):
(1) x F K L GE M= ( , , , ).
 By gross energy we mean energy input with a byproduct “waste of energy” which reduces the
efficiency of the production process. In the theory of production the assumption is made that
production is characterized by points on the production frontier. The assumption of free
disposal of waste takes care of inefficiency in energy use. We argue that awareness for energy
conservation should be raised in order to achieve production close to the production
possibility frontier. We distinguish between gross energy and net energy (E) input where
 
 (2) E GE and WE GE ☺    ( ) , ,1 0 1  
 
 with WE as gross waste and ∀ as the waste coefficient or coefficient of energy inefficiency.
Therefore, the function in (1) is not a production function because it does not characterize
efficient production.
The net energy input has to be the appropriate argument in F(θ) for F to be a
production function:
(3) x f K L E M= ( , , , )
8 To improve energy efficiency, i.e. to reduce the waste coefficient, is costly because it requires
time and effort, and hence causes cost of labor and material. We denote with e the effort to
reduce the waste of energy and assume ∀(e) to be a function of this effort
( ( ) , ( ) )    e e0 0 . For the empirical implementation, e will be the intensity of R&D
activities to improve energy efficiency. We also include e as an argument in the production
function in order to represent the aspect that a higher effort (R&D level) in avoiding waste of
energy will reduce productivity in terms of less output with given levels of KLEM inputs.
Using (2) and (3), we cast the standard cost minimizing problem
 
 min ( ) . . ( , , , )
, , ,K L GE M E
PK K PL L PGE t GE PM M s t x F K L GE M⋅ + ⋅ + + + ⋅ =
 
 in such a way that the net quantity of energy E and not of gross energy GE is the input the firm
focuses on
 
(4) min
( )
. . ( , , , , )
, , , ,K L E M e
EPK K PL L PGE t
e
E PM M s t x f K L E M e⋅ + ⋅ + +
−
⋅ + ⋅ =
1 α
with  fe 0 .
5 PK, PL, PGE, PM are the prices of capital, labor, gross energy and material and
tE is the tax rate on energy. We include the tax rate tE as a reminder that it can be used as a
policy instrument to raise energy efficiency.
Next we define the price of energy to be
(5) PE e t PGE t
eE
E( ; )
( )


☺1 
with
(6) PE PGE te E

☺
 

( )
( )
1
02
                                                          
5  If a function is specified in several variables, a subscript indicates a derivative. If there is only one variable,
normal derivatives are used. It is f F Ee GE= ⋅ ⋅ ′ − <α α/ ( )1 0
2 , that is, increasing e is equivalent to the output
effect of reducing GE.
9i.e. effort e reduces the price for the efficient energy input. Since the cost function, dual to the
production function, is more convenient for the analysis we have in mind, we state the
problem as one of profit maximization under perfect competition by using a cost function:
(7) max ( , , , ( ; ), , )
,x e E
p x C x PK PL PE e t PM eΠ = ⋅ −
with PE as defined in (5). The decline in output from the GE-reducing effect of effort e is now
expressed in terms of Ce 0 and Cee 0. An environmentally friendly production process
with emphasis on energy conservation increases the cost for producing x. The benefit is a
lower price PE due to energy efficiency of the input energy.
The FOC with respect to x is:
(8) p C x PK PL PE PM ex− =( , , , , , ) 0 ,
and the FOC with respect to e is:
(9) ☺ ☺ E PE Ce e 0
because of Shephard’s Lemma ( )E CPE . According to (9), the level of e is optimal if
marginal savings in the cost of energy justifies exactly the increase in the cost of producing
output x with a more energy efficient technology. PEe is negative because an increase in effort
reduces waste of energy and raises net energy.
3. Comparative Statics
In order to determine the effect of a change in the energy tax tE on production, effort and
energy wasted, we totally differentiate equations (8) (i.e. x 0) and (9) (i.e. e 0 ):
(10)   xx xe x t Edx de dtE ☺
(11)   ex ee e t Edx de dtE ☺
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To obtain unambiguous qualitative results and to simplify the analysis it is convenient to find
an assumption which implies  xe ex 0. Such an assumption is a homothetic production
function. The comparative statics analysis shows that the elasticity of output with respect to
the energy tax is
(12) d x
d t
t GE
p xE
E E x
MC x
ln
ln
,
,
☺





0 ,
where the elasticities 0 of energy or marginal cost with respect to output are positive. The
higher the energy tax in relation to revenue, the higher the negative impact on output from the
tax. Furthermore, the change in effort e with respect to a change in the energy tax is
(13) de
dt
GE WE
eE
E e E PE PE e
e
ee

   
☺


( ), , ,
,  



1 0

where ee 0 due to the strict concavity assumption of the profit function in e and x. As we
expect de
dtE
0 , the numerator in (13) should turn out to be negative. First of all, all
elasticities ε  are negative. The elasticity of energy input with respect to effort e E e, , , is
negative by assumption because we assume that effort to reduce energy inefficiency is energy
saving. E PE,  is negative since it is a price elasticity of input demand; the elasticity of the price
of energy with respect to e, i.e. ε PE e, , is negative because of PEe 0 (see (6)), and the
elasticity of the inefficiency coefficient ( )e  with respect to e is negative as  0. We will
assume that the product of the two elasticities, which is a positive figure, will not dominate
the two negative effects in the numerator; i.e. the effect of e on energy demand via the price
PE is weaker than the sum of the direct effects of e on energy saving productivity as well as
on lowering the inefficiency coefficient. This seems to be a reasonable assumption and it
justifies the positive sign in (13).
It is of interest to decompose the impact of the energy tax on reducing to waste energy.
By differentiating the equation for WE,
WE e
e
E x PE e t eE
☺


( )
( )
( , ( , ), )
1
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totally, the following five aspects are captured by our model:6
d WE
d t
d e
d t
d x
d t
PE
t
d e
d t
d e
d tE
e
E
E x
E
E PE
E
PE e
E
E e
E
ln
ln
ln
ln
ln
ln
ln
ln
ln
ln
ln
ln
,
, , , ,
☺
  
F
HG
I
KJ


 


 

1
.
The first term is negative and represents the effect of a higher tax on e (positive) which in turn
lowers the waste coefficient ∀. The second term (also negative) captures the reduction in
energy wasted due to a lower production level. The third term (negative) represents the
demand effect on E because tE increases the price of efficiently used energy E. The fourth
term (the only positive one) shows an offsetting effect of tE on E because an energy tax raises
effort, effort in turn lowers PE via  ( )e 0, which then raises the demand for E. The fifth
term (negative) finally shows the benefit of a tax in terms of an energy saving bias of the
effort. The model therefore captures all relevant aspects for an energy conservation policy
which aims at reducing inefficiency in energy intensive industries. Although this approach
looks like having endogenized technical change, it can not be used to make predictions or to
recommend the introduction of certain technologies. However, an econometric estimation of
the model may help us with our search for endogenizing technological change.
4. Empirical implementation
For implementing our approach towards endogenizing technical change we measure effort e
by the capital stock of R&D investment in energy saving process innovation. For that purpose
we split up R&D expenditure of an industry in expenditure on product innovation and in those
for process innovation.7 The latter will be split again, this time in R&D investment in energy
saving innovations, RDE, and in non-energy saving innovation, RDNE, which means
expenditures to reduce the cost of the production process. The stock of R&D capital (KRDE)
to achieve an energy saving production process is calculated by the accumulation method
(14) KRDE KRDE RDEt t t= − ⋅ +−( )1 1δ
                                                          
6  A  is used if the elasticity is negative and  is used if it is positive.
7 The source of these data is the Stifterverband-Wissenschaftsstatistik GmbH. The suggested split of R&D
expenditure is only published for some years.
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where δ  is the rate at which knowledge is rendered. Similarly, the stock of R&D capital
(KRDNE) to achieve a reduction in the cost of production is
(15) KRDNE KRDNE RDNEt t t= − ⋅ +−( )1 1δ
As a case study we choose the chemicals industry.
For the econometric analysis we replace the cost function in (7) by
(7’)
max ( , , , ( , ), )
( )
, ,x KRDE KRDNE E
p x C x PK PL PE KRDE t PM KRDNE
PKRD KRDE KRDNE
RDΠ = ⋅ − ⋅
− ⋅ +
−α
There is Hicks-neutral technical change with respect to non-energy R&D capital, and PKRD is
the user cost of capital per unit of both types of R&D capital stocks. The FOC (9) can be
rewritten as
(9’) − ⋅ − =E PE PKRDKRDE 0
For our econometric analysis it is preferable to approximate ( ( ))1 1− −α KRDE  in
PE KRDE tE( , ) by exp
ρ
KRDE
FH IK. Therefore, PE is
(16) PE KRDE t
KRDE
PGE tE E( , ) exp ( )=
FH IK⋅ +ρ
Equivalently, E is8
(17) E
KRDE
GE= −FH IK⋅exp ρ
                                                          
8 In Capros et. al. GE is multiplied by N, a cumulative stock of energy saving technology. The price PGE is then
divided by N. From the steady state solution the optimal demand for investment in energy-saving technology is
obtained. The energy augmenting technical change factor is in Capros et. al. a stock.
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where ( )1−α       in      E GE= − ⋅( )1 α      is
(18) 1 1− = −FH IK≤α ρ( ) expKRDE KRDE .
The parameter ρ > 0 captures how rapidly maximum energy efficiency ( )ρ = 0  is approached
as KRDE increases. The functional form for the relationship between KRDE and energy
efficiency approximates the fact that as one spends more and more R&D expenditure for an
energy efficient process, there is a limit to the amount of energy savings that can result.
Expenditures on energy have to satisfy the identity
PE E PGE t GEE( ) ( ) ( )⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = + ⋅ .
With this exponential specification the FOC (9’) yields
(9’’) KRDE PGE t GE
PKRD
E2
=
+ ⋅ρ ( )
where PKRD PRD r= +( )δ  with PRD as the price of R&D expenditure and r as the rate of
return (interest rate for government bonds).
As a specification of a cost function we choose the translog specification of a
homothetic production technology. With restrictions imposed on the parameters from
symmetry of the β ’s and from linear homogeneity in prices the translog cost function is:
(19)
ln ln ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln
ln ln
ln ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln
C PK x PL PM KRDNE
PGE KRDE PL PM
PGE PGE KRDE KRDE
PL PM PL PGE KRDE PL
PM PGE KRDE PM
x L M RD
E LL MM
EE
LM LE
ME
= + + + + − ⋅
+ + ⋅ + +
+ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
−
− −
−
−
α α α α α
α ρ β β
β ρ ρ
β β ρ
β ρ
0
1 2 2
2 1 2 2
1
1
1
2
c h c
hd i
c h
c h
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where PL PL
PK
PM PM
PK
= =,  and PGE PGE t
PK
E
=
+ . PE in the cost function has been replaced
by PE( )⋅  as in (16). Since (8) can be written as p x
C
C
x
⋅
=
∂
∂
ln
ln
, using this cost function
specification, (8) becomes
(8’) p x
C x
⋅
= α
From Shephard’s Lemma we obtain the cost-shares as logarithmic derivatives of the cost
function:
(20) PL L
C
PL PM PGE
KRDEL LL LM LE
⋅
= + + + +FH IKα β β β ρln ln ln
(21) ( ) ln ln lnPGE t GE
C
PGE
KRDE
PL PME E EE LE ME
+ ⋅
= + +FH IK+ +α β ρ β β
(22) PM M
C
PM PL PGE
KRDEM MM LM ME
⋅
= + + + +FH IKα β β β ρln ln ln
We have omitted the equation for the cost share of capital because cost shares add up to one
and error terms to zero. Therefore the parameters of the cost share of capital can be derived
from the parameter restrictions:
α α α α
β β β β
L M K
LL LE LM LK etc
+ + + =
+ + + =
E 1
0 .
Finally, the FOC with respect to KRDNE is
(23) PKRD KRDNE
C
C
KRDNE RD
⋅
= −
∂
∂
=
ln
ln
α
We have estimated the parameters of the system (19), (8’), (9’’) and (20) - (23) using the
maximum likelihood method.
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5. Results from estimation and simulation
Yearly data on prices and quantities and on R&D expenditures have been collected for the
chemical industry for the years 1970-1995. Between 21% and 26% of total R&D expenditure
are spent for process innovation. As there are no data on R&D investment in energy saving
innovations, we used the share of abatement expenditure for reducing air pollution in total
environmental abatement expenditure of the chemical industry. This percentage was 27% in
1970, 46% in 1985 and about 33% after 1993. Since efforts to reduce emissions from burning
fossil fuel could be equivalent to investments in energy saving innovation we consider these
percentage figures as a reasonable proxy.9 In Table 1 we present the parameter estimates of
our system of equations and the level of the R&D stock for some selected years. The
efficiency factor in E
KRDE
GE= −FH IK⋅exp .0 162  is 86 percent in 1970 and improves up to 94
percent in the nineties. The effective price of energy, PE
KRDE
PGE tE=
FH IK⋅ +exp .0 162 b g is
therefore 115 percent higher than the market price PGE tE+  and drops to 106 percent above
this price. The elasticity of costs with respect to the stock of non-energy process innovation is
α RD = −0 007. .
For an interpretation of the β -parameters we could employ the Allen-Hicks partial
elasticity of substitution expressed by σ βij ij i j i js s s s= + ⋅ ≠( ) /    i ja f and
σ ii ii i ib s s= + −1b g / si2  where si  are the cost shares ( e.g. s PL L CL = ⋅ /  ). Here we present
price elasticities of the inputs which can be calculated by multiplying σ ij  by the cost shares,
i.e. ε σij j ijs= ⋅ . With sE = = =0 07 0 24 0 6. . .  ,s  ,sL M  and sK = 0 09.  as mean of the cost
shares, the matrix of input price elasticities is
ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε ε
LL
KK KE KM
EL EK EE EM
ML MK ME MM
LK LE LM
KL
.12
F
H
GGGG
I
K
JJJJ
=
− −
− −
− − −
− −
F
H
GGGG
I
K
JJJJ
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . .
35 8 04 31
21 0 11 10
13 14 63 90
02 10 20
.
Labor and energy are more price elastic than capital and material. Substitutional relations are
as expected: material and energy are substitutes as are material and labor, and labor and
                                                          
9  According to internal information from a manager of a big chemical firm (which spends 15% of total R&D
expenditures of the chemical industry), 60 percent of process R&D expenditures have been spent yearly for
improving energy efficiency in the years 1982-84.
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capital. Also the complementary relations are as expected: capital and material are
complements as are energy and capital. However, in view of the double dividend discussion of
raising the price of energy and reducing non-wage labor costs in order to improve the state of
the environment and of unemployment, the complementary relationship between energy and
labor is somewhat surprising.
Table 1: Parameter estimates and energy efficiency
Parameters Coefficients t-statistic year KRDE in
1985 prices
Efficiency
α x
γ
α L
α M
α E
α Kβ LLβ EEβMM
ρ
β LMβ LEβ ME
α RDβ KLβ KKβ KEβ KM
1.04
0.024
0.23
0.61
0.08
0.07
0.097
0.021
0.11
0.162
-0.068
-0.026
0.021
0.007
-0.003
0.082
-0.016
-0.063
168
3.41
59
86
50
-
31
16.3
12
3.6
5.15
-24.7
3.59
-24.9
-
-
-
-
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1.14
1.15
1.37
1.55
1.76
1.73
1.83
1.96
2.50
2.88
2.91
2.91
2.83
2.66
2.53
2.43
0.867
0.868
0.888
0.900
0.912
0.910
0.915
0.920
0.937
0.945
0.946
0.946
0.944
0.940
0.938
0.935
We finally have simulated the impact of a higher price for energy on improvement in energy
efficiency. We raised the tax tE  such that the price for energy increased by 5 percent per year
beginning in 1981. The energy price in 1995 is therefore twice as high as in the base case.
This has an effect on cost C and output x according to (19) and (8’), on energy demand GE
(21), and on the stock KRDE of R&D capital for energy saving process innovation. This
variable then improves energy efficiency in (17). The base case has been generated with the
estimated system which has also been used to simulate the energy tax effect. In the tax
simulation we keep output x constant and changed the output price according to the revenue-
cost share (8’). We therefore have isolated the substitution effects from the output effect. In
Table 2 we present the percentage changes of some variables and of the efficiency index.
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T
able 2: T
he im
pact of a five percent higher energy price per year
year
price p and
cost C
 in %
cost share s
E
of energy
change of energy
G
E in %
cost share s
L
of labor
change of labor
L in %
cost share s
M
of m
aterial
1981
1985
1990
1995
+0.41
+2.10
+3.43
+5.18
+0.001
+0.005
+0.01
+0.016
-3.21
-15.05
-26.5
-36.9
-0.001
-0.006
-0.013
-0.019
-0.18
-0.70
-1.47
-1.80
+0.001
+0.005
+0.01
+0.016
year
change of m
aterial
M
 in %
cost share s
K
of capital
change of capital
K
 in %
change of K
RD
N
E
in %
change of K
RD
E
in %
energy efficiency
exp
−ρ
K
RD
E
a
f  in %
1981
1985
1990
1995
+0.58
+2.96
+5.33
+8.12
-0.001
-0.004
-0.008
-0.012
-0.55
-3.86
-4.73
-8.33
+0.41
+2.10
+3.43
+5.18
+0.81
+4.13
+9.41
+14.53
+0.06
+0.25
+0.70
+1.01
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      The energy tax has increased cost by 5.18 percent in 1995. Under our assumption of an
exogenous output level x prices have increased by the same percentage figure. Since PGE tE+
is more than twice as high in 1995 than in 1981, the cost share sE  of energy increased
although gross energy demand declined by 36.9 percent in 1995 compared to the base case.
Energy input E itself declined by only 35.9 percent because one percent of the decline of 36.9
percent has been compensated by improvement in energy efficiency (see + 1.01 in the last
column). This effect is disappointingly low. The reason is our econometric finding which
describes a production process with outsourcing as the main reaction on higher energy prices.
Such a process is characterized by a reduction in the complements of energy, namely labor
and capital, and by an increase in material. Material is required if energy is recycled in terms
of waste heat used to substitute heat produced with energy. Material demand is increased if
energy intensive activities are outsourced like clay and glass, transportation services, printing
and publishing, fabricated metal, instruments, petroleum and coal products, rubber and
plastics. Years ago big chemical plants produced electricity on the plant location. Nowadays
they sign an agreement with producers of the machinery industry to set up as an independent
company power plants on the ground of the firm. Although this is energy input, the delivery
comes from the machinery industry; i.e. from material. As can be seen from the Table, a
decline in energy, labor and in capital parallels outsourcing. Finally, higher costs enhance non-
energy R&D capital by 5.18 percent in order to reduce the cost of production (see (23) and the
column for KRDNE). The higher costs of energy induce more R&D capital to improve energy
efficiency (see (9’’) and + 14.53% in11th column), which in turn improves energy efficiency
by 1.01%.
6. Summary and conclusion
The objective of this paper was to develop a simple model of production where energy is used
inefficiently due to waste of energy. More effort in terms of R&D investment in process
innovation could, however, reduce the gap between gross energy and net energy. Whereas
factor augmenting technical change increases energy input by a certain percentage per year or,
equivalently, reduces the user cost of energy by that percentage, our interpretation is that
technical process closes the gap between energy purchased and energy used effectively. The
more is invested in energy saving process R&D, the better is the utilization of purchased gross
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energy and the less is the waste of energy. In terms of prices our approach implies that the
effective price of a unit of energy used in the production process is higher than the price of
that unit purchased on the market because part of that unit is wasted due to inefficiencies. The
benefit of R&D investment is that the higher user cost of energy becomes closer to the
purchase price of energy.
We have chosen a KLEM cost function approach for incorporating the cost and benefit
of R&D investment in process innovation. In a comparative statics analysis we introduced an
energy tax as an incentive to raise energy efficiency. We have derived its impact on R&D
effort, on output and on the waste of energy. We then have implemented our model
empirically by choosing a translog cost function for deriving a system of first-order
conditions. We estimated the unknown parameters of relative price responses, the efficiency
parameter for the use of energy, and the parameter for cost reducing R&D investment in
process innovation using data for the German chemical industry. We found out that labor and
capital are substitutes as are labor and material, but that energy and labor are complements as
are energy and capital. The implication of these relations are that a higher tax on energy will
not yield a double dividend for the chemical industry in terms of more employment in that
industry together with a better quality of the environment or the savings of natural resources.
As shown by our simulation result, the effect of a higher energy tax will be outsourcing by
increasing material input and by reducing the other three inputs labor, energy and capital.
However, if one wants to know the effect of outsourcing on total employment in the economy,
a computable general equilibrium analysis is required in order to embed the partial
equilibrium outcome in a general equilibrium framework.
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